Awaiting a shake-up of American military and diplomatic personnel, and news that more troops might go to Iraq

WASHINGTON (Economist) January 5, 2006 — “Go big, go long or go home.” Those were said to be the Pentagon’s internal nicknames for the options in Iraq. Add more troops, prepare for a long slog in the country, or get out. Washington, DC, is now buzzing with rumors not only that senior military and diplomatic staff are being shifted around (the ambassador to Iraq is to change; there will be new military commanders in the region too) but also that George Bush is considering mixed portions of “go big” and “go long”: a temporary surge of troops to allow a last crack at establishing security, before leaving a smaller number of soldiers in Iraq to continue training Iraqis.

In particular, Mr. Bush is reported to be mulling a plan by Jack Keane, a former general, and Frederick Kagan, a military analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank. The two men propose a temporary and concentrated surge focused on Baghdad. They would send around 30,000 extra combat troops to Iraq, most for the capital but a few also for Anbar, the most violent Sunni-majority province.

Critics, especially Democrats, note that previous Baghdad-focused surges failed to bring peace or stability to the city and suggest that there is no point doubling down on a failed strategy. But Messrs Keane and Kagan argue that the previous surges involved just a few thousand extra soldiers, while their plan would see the number of American combat troops in Baghdad rise from 17,500 to 42,000. The extra Americans would not only be expected to clamp down on the violence in the mixed Shia and Sunni neighborhoods, but would also stay there. And as the soldiers deploy, say the two planners, Congress should make money available for reconstruction projects, which would take place at military commanders’ discretion. Soldiers handing out cash would, they believe, be more likely to win the trust and affection of locals.

The Keane-Kagan plan stands in direct contradiction to the recent report by the Iraq Study Group, led by James Baker, a former secretary of state. That recommended gradually drawing down combat troops in Iraq, and focusing the remaining ones on training Iraqis. (Keane-Kagan would ease up on the training for the time being.) It also recommended a regional conference, to encourage co-operation with Syria and Iran and a new push for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Mr. Bush’s people have pooh-poohed most of these suggestions.

The difference between the two plans is significant. The Baker group proceeded on the assumption that there is no military solution in Iraq. The longer that American troops were left protecting the Iraqi government, the less there would be an incentive to seek national reconciliation, especially between Shias and Sunnis. By making it clear that America is heading for the exit, the Baker group argued, Iraqi minds would be concentrated on resolving their differences.

The Keane-Kagan plan, by contrast, says that no national reconciliation is possible while Iraqis are slaughtering one another. Security, therefore, is a necessary condition before any political progress can be expected. And that requires more American troops. A surge just might bring some stability to the most important part of the country, Baghdad, at which point America could begin to withdraw. Then the training of Iraqis could begin in earnest again, perhaps by the end of 2007.

Could it succeed? Americans might support a surge if there seemed to be a chance of it working, although few politicians sound enthusiastic about the idea at the moment. In the short term it may not be difficult to raise an extra 30,000 troops for Iraq, but longer-term it may be hard to sustain the higher levels of troops, at least without breaking promises to serving soldiers about leave, training and the frequency of tours of duty. There might also be more pressure on the National Guard. Mr. Bush has proposed that the overall size of the army should be increased.

It is another question whether the extra soldiers would be sufficient for the task. A new manual for the American army and marines suggests that counterinsurgency work requires a different mindset for soldiers. Iit even refers to “armed social work.” It also suggests that some 20-25 members of the security forces are needed for every thousand civilians. If that were right, then some 100,000 soldiers, both Iraqi and American, might be needed for Baghdad’s 5m-odd people alone.