WASHINGTON (By Michael R. Gordon, NYTimes)
November 1, 2006 — A
classified briefing prepared two weeks ago by the United States Central
Command portrays Iraq as edging toward chaos, in a chart that the military
is using as a barometer of civil conflict.
A one-page slide shown at the Oct. 18
briefing provides a rare glimpse into how the military command that oversees
the war is trying to track its trajectory, particularly in terms of
sectarian fighting.
The slide includes a color-coded bar chart
that is used to illustrate an “Index of Civil Conflict.” It shows a sharp
escalation in sectarian violence since the bombing of a Shiite shrine in
Samarra in February, and tracks a further worsening this month despite a
concerted American push to tamp down the violence in Baghdad.
In fashioning the index, the military is
weighing factors like the ineffectual Iraqi police and the dwindling
influence of moderate religious and political figures, rather than more
traditional military measures such as the enemy’s fighting strength and the
control of territory.
The conclusions the Central Command has
drawn from these trends are not encouraging, according to a copy of the
slide that was obtained by The New York Times. The slide shows Iraq as
moving sharply away from “peace,” an ideal on the far left side of the
chart, to a point much closer to the right side of the spectrum, a red zone
marked “chaos.” As depicted in the command’s chart, the needle has been
moving steadily toward the far right of the chart.
An intelligence summary at the bottom of
the slide reads “urban areas experiencing ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns to
consolidate control” and “violence at all-time high, spreading
geographically.” According to a Central Command official, the index on civil
strife has been a staple of internal command briefings for most of this
year. The analysis was prepared by the command’s intelligence directorate,
which is overseen by Brig. Gen. John M. Custer.
Gen. John P. Abizaid, who heads the
command, warned publicly in August about the risk of civil war in Iraq, but
he said then that he thought it could be averted. In evaluating the
prospects for all-out civil strife, the command concentrates on “key reads,”
or several principal variables.
According to the slide from the Oct. 18
briefing, the variables include “hostile rhetoric” by political and
religious leaders, which can be measured by listening to sermons at mosques
and to important Shiite and Sunni leaders, and the amount of influence that
moderate political and religious figures have over the population. The other
main variables are assassinations and other especially provocative sectarian
attacks, as well as “spontaneous mass civil conflict.”
A number of secondary indicators are also
taken into account, including activity by militias, problems with
ineffective police, the ability of Iraqi officials to govern effectively,
the number of civilians who have been forced to move by sectarian violence,
the willingness of Iraqi security forces to follow orders, and the degree to
which the Iraqi Kurds are pressing for independence from the central
government.
These factors are evaluated to create the
index of civil strife, which has registered a steady worsening for months.
“Ever since the February attack on the Shiite mosque in Samarra, it has been
closer to the chaos side than the peace side,” said a Central Command
official who asked not to be identified because he was talking about
classified information.
In the Oct. 18 brief, the index moved still
another notch toward “chaos.” That briefing was prepared three days before
General Abizaid met in Washington with President Bush, Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to take stock of the situation in Iraq.
A spokesman for the Central Command
declined to comment on the index or other information in the slide. “We
don’t comment on secret material,” the spokesman said.
One significant factor in the military’s
decision to move the scale toward “chaos” was the expanding activity by
militias.
Another reason was the limitations of Iraqi
government security forces, which despite years of training and equipping by
the United States, are either ineffective or, in some cases, infiltrated by
the very militias they are supposed to be combating. The slide notes that
“ineffectual” Iraqi police forces have been a significant problem, and cites
as a concern sectarian conflicts between Iraqi security forces.
Other significant factors are in the
political realm. The slide notes that Iraq’s political and religious leaders
have lost some of their moderating influence over their constituents or
adherents.
Notably, the slide also cites difficulties
that the new Iraqi administration has experienced in “governance.” That
appears to be shorthand for the frustration felt by American military
officers about the Iraqi government’s delays in bringing about a genuine
political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis. It also appears to
apply to the lack of reconstruction programs to restore essential services
and the dearth of job creation efforts to give young Iraqis an alternative
to joining militias, as well as the absence of firm action against militias.
The slide lists other factors that are
described as important but less significant. They include efforts by Iran
and Syria to enable violence by militias and insurgent groups and the
interest by many Kurds in achieving independence. The slide describes
violence motivated by sectarian differences as having moved into a
“critical” phase.
The chart does note some positive
developments. Specifically, it notes that “hostile rhetoric” by political
and religious leaders has not increased. It also notes that Iraqi security
forces are refusing less often than in the past to take orders from the
central government and that there has been a drop-off in mass desertions.
Still, for a military culture that thrives
on PowerPoint briefings, the shifting index was seen by some officials as a
stark warning about the difficult course of events in Iraq, and mirrored
growing concern by some military officers.
